

5th Edition

Anna Getmansky
Alejandro Quiroz Flores

APPLYING **THE STRATEGIC** **PERSPECTIVE**



Problems and Models



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THE STRATEGIC
PERSPECTIVE**

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NOTE TO STUDENTS

As you may have already discovered, the fourth edition of *Principles of International Politics* is a unique international relations textbook. Like other introductory texts, it attempts to give you a wide-ranging view of the field and its impressive body of scholarship. Yet, unlike most textbooks, *Principles* challenges you to analyze real political problems in a rigorous fashion using mathematical tools. Although the text will take you step by step through these analytic tools, applying them effectively requires practice. Applying the Strategic Perspective will help you do just that. It offers additional explanations, examples, and exercises to help you employ important theoretical concepts and technical skills. You will not find instruction for every subsection of every chapter of *Principles*. Instead, the workbook offers advice, information, and help on the text's most important technical methods.

HOW TO USE THIS BOOK

This is a book that is meant to be used—written in, scribbled on, and eventually torn up. As you work, you will find that you will need colored pens or pencils or highlighters and a simple calculator such as the ones on most cell phones or computers to solve some of the problems in this workbook. After you have worked through and solved exercises, your instructor may ask you to submit certain pages as homework. The workbook's pages are perforated to make this easy. We have endeavored to leave the space necessary for you to work right in the workbook, but in some cases, you may need more space to solve a problem than is provided. Should this occur, do your work on a separate sheet, write the answer in the workbook, and attach the sheet to the assignment. In other cases, you may simply want to follow along through the workbook as you read corresponding sections of the main text.

In general, when you see mathematical work in the text, you should consider working through the math alongside the text, and/or consulting this workbook for additional explanation. Don't let the math worry you: *Principles* uses absolutely no math beyond what the SAT and ACT cover. Whereas most textbooks are designed to be read with a highlighter in hand, this one works best with a pencil and notebook paper for working through the examples on your own. It is important that you feel comfortable using the technical methods as they are introduced because you will be asked to apply them again in later sections of the book. The examples and exercises on these pages should help as you become familiar with the tools of *Principles* and allow you to gain a deeper understanding of the strategic perspective in international relations. Don't be shy, though. Be sure to ask your instructor to clarify any point you do not understand.

INTRODUCTION

Exercise I-1. Core Arguments

This chapter makes four important arguments about international politics. For each argument, consider these corresponding questions.

Argument 1: International affairs are consequences of rational actions.

What does rationality mean? Give an example (real or hypothetical) of a rational action and an example (real or hypothetical) of an action that is not considered to be rational according to the definition presented in the chapter.

Argument 2: International relations cannot be separated from domestic politics or from foreign policy.

What are some domestic political factors that might affect international political actions or choices? Give an example of one of these factors affecting the foreign policy of your country. What are some international political factors that might affect domestic political actions or choices? Again, give a brief example from your country.

Argument 3: Leaders take actions—both domestic and international—because they want to stay in power.

Give an example of a leader taking an international action that, in your view, contributed to his or her retaining power. Give an example of a leader taking an international (or domestic) action that contributed to his or her losing power. What else, besides retaining personal power, might motivate leaders to act in certain ways?

Argument 4: Relations between nations and between leaders are driven by reasoned decision making and strategic considerations.

Think about some actions your country's leader has taken recently in international politics.

i) What are some alternative actions the leader could have taken in these situations, but did not? In other words, what were the leader's choices or options?

j) How do the leader's choices reflect strategic considerations—that is, the anticipated reactions of domestic and international actors? Why do you believe some of the other options were *not* chosen?

Exercise I-2. Theories, Titles, and Assumptions

The titles below are actual books and articles in international relations. Based on the title alone, indicate on the line whether you think the article or book has a Neorealist (NR), Liberal (L), or Constructivist (C) approach to international relations.

- a) "Cooperation under Anarchy" _____
- b) "Normative Power Europe" _____
- c) "The False Promise of International Institutions" _____
- d) "Anarchy Is What States Make of It" _____
- e) *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions* _____
- f) "Between Regimes and Realism—Transnational Agenda Setting: Soviet Compliance with CSCE Human Rights Norms" _____
- g) "State Power and International Trade" _____
- h) "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change" _____

Exercise I-3. Leaders' Personal Goals, Domestic Political Constraints, and

International Strategic Considerations

For each of the international situations below, identify one way in which the leaders' personal goals, their domestic political constraints, and their strategic considerations with regard to the other nation could influence the outcome of the situation.

- a) Two countries are negotiating a treaty to reduce trade barriers between themselves.

Leaders' personal goals: _____

Domestic political constraints: _____

Strategic considerations with regard to the other nation: _____

- b) China, Russia, Japan, and the US negotiate with North Korea over its nuclear weapons and missile testing programs.

Leaders' personal goals: _____

Domestic political constraints: _____

Strategic considerations with regard to the other nation: _____

- c) The UN is deciding whether to send an international force to Syria to end the civil war, restore order in that country, and rebuild its government and economy.

Leaders' personal goals: _____

Domestic political constraints: _____

Strategic considerations with regard to the other nation: _____

- d) Israel and the Palestinians negotiate a possible peaceful settlement of their conflict.

Leaders' personal goals: _____

Domestic political constraints: _____

Strategic considerations with regard to the other nation: _____

CHAPTER 1

EVALUATING ARGUMENTS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Exercise 1-1. *Developing a Theory*

- i) Suppose you are writing a scientific article about the NBA draft. You are interested in developing a theory about which players are more likely to get drafted by an NBA team. In one paragraph, specify your assumption(s), apply basic logic, and generate a prediction (or predictions) about which features make players more likely to be drafted by an NBA team.

- j) What is the dependent variable in your theory?

- k) What is (are) the independent variable(s) in your theory?

- l) How would you test your theory empirically? What evidence would falsify your theory? What evidence would support your theory?

Exercise 1-2. *Developing a Theory in International Relations—the Case of Economic Sanctions*

The US and other governments have been increasingly using economic sanctions to extract policy concessions from other states. For example, the US has recently announced economic sanctions against Syria following the violent civil war in that country. Similarly, the US has imposed sanctions on Iran and on North Korea to coerce them to halt their nuclear and missile programs, as well as on Burma and Zimbabwe due to the human rights abuses in these countries. Despite the increasing popularity of sanctions as a foreign policy tool, there is no consensus as to their effectiveness in extracting policy concessions from states and entities that they target. Proponents of sanctions suggest that they may work if they impose costs that are sufficiently high to

make sustaining the controversial policy less attractive for the sanctions' targets. An example often cited in support of the argument that sanctions could work is the case of South Africa, where it has been argued that sanctions played a key role in the weakening of the apartheid regime. Conversely, those who argue that economic sanctions are ineffective suggest that they may backfire by making the target more determined not to yield to international pressure, and more resolute in maintaining the controversial policies. Examples of failed sanctions include those imposed against the regime of Saddam Hussein after the first Gulf War.

- i) Suppose you were studying the role of economic sanctions in promoting compliance of foreign governments with international human rights standards. What is the dependent variable? What is the independent variable?

- j) Think about a theory that might explain the effectiveness of sanctions. Under what conditions are sanctions more likely to be effective? Think about events or situations that might make the target more sensitive to the costs of sanctions. Propose an assumption (or a set of assumptions), apply logic, and derive a prediction (or a set of predictions) about the conditions that could increase the effectiveness of the sanctions.

- k) How would you test your theory empirically? Which cases would you include in your empirical analysis?

Exercise 1-3. Constructing Hypotheses

Theories are constructed to answer questions about relationships between variables and to improve our ability to predict future events. Consider the following concepts:

- Regime type

- Income per capita
- Election year
- Defense spending
- Interstate conflict
- War
- Economic growth
- Imprisonment of political opponents
- Cross-border air pollution
- Peaceful resolution of conflicts
- Refugees
- Openness to international trade
- Tariffs
- Rainfall
- Geographical distance
- Genocide
- Criminal responsibility
- Women's rights
- Human trafficking
- Major powers
- Alliances
- Marine protected areas
- Compliance
- International organizations
- Multilateral peacekeeping
- Peace
- Colonial past
- Natural resources
- Domestic political opposition
- Cultural exchange
- Foreign aid
- Democratization

i) Propose at least three research questions using the above list of concepts.

ii) Construct at least three different hypotheses that provide potential answers to these questions.

iii) Propose a way of testing each hypothesis.

l) What evidence would falsify each hypothesis?

Exercise 1-4. *Selecting among Competing Theories*

One of the most important and policy-relevant questions in international relations is whether membership in international treaties constrains future behavior of states. For example, are non-nuclear states that are members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) less likely to acquire nuclear weapons than they would be if they did not join the NPT? Similarly, are states that join international human rights treaties less likely to commit human rights abuses than they would be if they were not members in these treaties? Two influential theories of international relations offer alternative answers to this question. One is the neorealist theory, and the other is the liberal theory. You read about them in the introduction section of the textbook.

i) Briefly outline the neorealist and the liberal answers to this question. What does each theory predict with regard to the effect of a treaty membership on states' future behavior?

j) What assumptions does each theory make? How do their predictions follow from their assumptions?

k) How would you decide which theory is better able to explain the effect of international treaties on member states' behavior? Which standards for comparing theories would you apply?

Exercise 1-5. Falsifying a Theory

After the end of the Cold War, many international relations scholars had hypothesized about the effect of this change on international conflicts. One influential scholar, Samuel Huntington, offered the following prediction:

“It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”¹

- i) Which factors, according to Huntington, could explain conflict in the post–Cold War period? Which factor does Huntington believe to be the best explanation among the possible explanations he alluded to in the preceding paragraph?

- j) In Huntington’s theory, what is the dependent variable, and what is the main independent variable?

- k) Do you think Huntington’s theory is falsifiable? If yes, what evidence, in principle, could falsify his theory? If not, explain why you consider his theory to be unfalsifiable.

- l) How would you apply the first principle of wing walking to decide whether we should abandon the traditional explanations of conflict that focused on power in favor of Huntington’s cultural explanation of conflict?

Exercise 1-6. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

- i) Suppose we wanted to test whether membership in the same international organizations makes countries more likely to cooperate. We collected the following data that describe the extent of correlation between membership in the same international organizations and an increase in cooperation. Based on [table 1.1](#) below, determine whether membership in international organizations is a necessary, a sufficient, a necessary and sufficient, or neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an increase in cooperation. Explain your answer in one to two sentences.

TABLE 1.1

International Organization Membership and Cooperation

		Increase in Cooperation	
		Yes	No
Members in the Same International Organization	Yes	10	2
	No	1	20

- j) Suppose you wanted to test the prediction that the religious differences between neighboring states are sufficient to produce an interstate conflict. You collected 100 observations of dyads of neighboring states with and without conflict, and with and without religious differences. In [table 1.2](#) below, propose a hypothetical distribution of observations that would be consistent with the argument that religious differences between two neighboring states are sufficient to ignite a conflict between them. What evidence would falsify this argument?

TABLE 1.2